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CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 21 SUMMER 1972 NUMBER 4
Hepatitis, Blood Transfusions, and Public Action
Marc A. Franklin*
Elsewhere I have explored the liability theories available to persons who con-
tract hepatitis as the result of a blood transfusion.' This article will consider
what the law might do, beyond tort liability, to reduce the incidence of death
and injury from this disease, which is, by far, the most serious risk of blood
transfusions. 2 A short summary will indicate the nature of the problem.
In the United States, some six million units of whole blood are drawn an-
nually from several sources.' About one-tenth comes from "altruistic" donors
Much of the substance of this article was first delivered as the Eighth Annual Pope John XXIII
Lecture at Catholic University School of Law on November 6, 1971. Dr. J. Garrott Allen and Dr.
Judith G. Pool of the Stanford University Medical Center have been very helpful during the
preparation of this article-as have the administrators of several local blood banks. Susan L.
Cooper and D. McCarty Thornton IV, students at the Stanford Law School, undertook much of
the field work and supplementary research. Sharon L. Foster, Stanford, A.B. 1971, did much of
the psychological research upon which this article draws. Although all have been very helpful, they
bear no responsibility for the suggestions discussed in the text.
* A.B., 1953 Cornell University; LL.B., 1956, Cornell Law School. Professor of Law, Stanford
University.
N.B.: Correspondence, interviews, and unpublished studies cited herein, unless noted other-
wise, are on file at the Catholic University Law Review office.
I. Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and A Proposal, 24 STAN. L. REV. 439
(1972). That article extensively discusses the medical aspects of the problem.
2. Several dangers other than hepatitis-including reactions caused by transfusion of incom-
patible blood, circulatory overload, bacterial contamination of donor blood, transmission of other
diseases such as malaria and syphillis, and infection due to unsterile instruments-are involved in
blood transfusions, but they occur very rarely. See generally AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
COMMITTEE ON TRANSFUSION AND TRANSPLANTATION, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF BLOOD
TRANSFUSION 9-17, 67-74 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as TRANSFUSION COMMITTEE REPORT].
3. R. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP 47-69, 90-91 (1971) [hereinafter cited as TITMUSS].
An additional two million units of blood are drawn annually by plasmapheresis, a process in which
about two pints of blood are withdrawn from the donor, the plasma removed, and the red cells
returned to the donor's body. This process, which can be safely repeated even twice a week, has
given rise to an entirely new class of professional donor with its own problems and dangers beyond
the scope of this article. See generally Hartney, Plasmapheresis Operations in the United
States-1968, 213 J.A.M.A. 1023 (1970). "Blood," as used in this article, refers to whole blood.
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who give their blood entirely gratis. Half of the total is volunteered by either
assurance donors or replacement donors. Assurance donors contribute an-
nually to a blood bank, often under a group blood plan, in return for the right
to draw blood if needed for themselves or their families during the following
year. The replacement donor, on the other hand, is usually donating blood on
behalf of someone who has already received a transfusion and may be facing a
charge of $25.00 per unit on any blood that is not replaced. Since these groups
have not been giving enough blood to meet the greater demand created by new
surgical techniques, reliance is increasingly placed upon donors who are paid,
usually five to ten dollars in cash, at the time they donate. As much as one-
third of our blood now comes from paid donors and most of this is drawn and
used in urban areas.
4
This article is addressed primarily to the serious health problem caused by
using paid donors whose blood is ten times more likely to carry hepatitis than
"volunteer" blood.5 In the United States at least 3,000 persons per year die
from transfusion-associated hepatitis.' At present, scientific testing of blood
donations can detect only one-fourth of the contaminated units, and there is
no effective immunization for prospective recipients.' In view of the substantial
4. For data on percentage of blood received from each donor type, see TITMUSS 94.
5. Ratios of hepatitis cases from commercial blood as compared with volunteer blood were
found in various clinical studies as follows: 10:1, prison to volunteer in Chicago Allen, Dawson,
Sayman, Humphreys, Benham & Havens, Blood Transfusions and Serum Hepatitis, 150 ANNALS
OF SURGERY 455 (1959); 70:1, addict and commercial to volunteer in New Jersey Cohen &
Dougherty, Transfusion Hepatitis Arising from Addict Blood Donors, 203 J.A.M.A. 427 (1968);
11:1, commercial fibrinogen added to volunteer blood compared to unmixed volunteer blood in
Seattle. Boeve, Winterscheid & Merendino, Fibrinogen-Transmitted Hepatitis in the Surgical
Patient, 170 ANNALS OF SURGERY 833 (1969); 11:1, commercial to volunteer in Washington, D.C.
Walsh, Purcell, Morrow, Chanock & Schmidt, Post-Transfusion Hepatitis After Open-Heart
Operations, 211 J.A.M.A. 261 (1970). The clinical studies are supported by reports based on the
tests discussed in the text at note 7, infra: 12:1, commercial to volunteer in New York City
Cherubin & Prince, Serum Hepatitis Specific Antigen (SH) in Commercial and Volunteer Sources
of Blood, II TRANSFUSION 25 (1971); 15:1, prison to volunteer in Boston letter from A. Kliman,
Director of the Massachusetts Red Cross Blood Program, in 284 NEW ENG. J. Mo. 109 (1971).
One unpublished study suggests that the rate may be as low as 6:1, commercial to volunteer letter
from Dr. Roderick Murray, Director, Maryland State Division of Biologics Standards, to Dr. J.
Garrott Allen, Professor of Surgery, Stanford University Medical Center, July 23, 1971
[hereinafter all reference to Dr. Allen, unless noted otherwise, is made to his capacity as Professor
of Surgery, Stanford University Medical Center].
By screening out all HAA positive donors and all commercial donors, one blood bank reduced
the hepatitis rate among heart surgery patients by 80 to 90 percent. Letter from Dr. Robert H.
Purcell, Maryland State Laboratory of Infectious Diseases, to Dr. Allen, July 8, 1971.
6. Since reporting is incomplete, the figures "may be much higher." National Academy of
Sciences-National Research Council, Statement on Laboratory Screening Tests for Identifying
Carriers of Viral Hepatitis in Blood-banking and Transfusion Services, 10 TRANSFUSION 1, 2
(1970).
7. Testing is based on an association between the presence of an antigen in the blood and the
presence of the disease. See, e.g., Blumberg, Sutnick, London & Millman, Australia Antigen and
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difference in incidence of hepatitis attributable to paid and unpaid donors, the
elimination of paid donors could mean a 90 percent reduction in the incidence
of transfusion-associated hepatitis, saving several thousand lives and avoiding
the long and serious incapacitation of many victims who survive. But the
enormity of this undertaking should not be underestimated: society would have
to locate a new source for the two million units of blood that are now bought
for cash each year. 8
Hepatitis, 283 NEw ENG. J. MED. 349, 352 (1970); Prince & Burke, Serum Hepatitis Antigen
(SH): Rapid Detection by High Voltage Immunoelectrosmophoresis, 169 SCIENCE 593 (1970);
N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1971, at I, col. I. The Red Cross began requiring the HAA test on Apr. I,
1971. Interview with Dr. Donald Avoy, Medical Director, American Red Cross Four County
Blood Bank, San Jose, Calif., Apr. 1, 1971. American Red Cross News Service release of Mar. 2,
1971. The American Association of Blood Banks followed suit in Fall, 1971. Massachusetts, by
regulations of its Department of Public Health effective Jan. I, 1971, became the first state to
require HAA testing. Note, 7 TRIAL 62 (Nov./Dec. 1971).
Research is being directed toward developing a technique for immunizing recipients against the
disease but this is not likely to occur soon. N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1971, at I, col. I.
8. "Cash" here also includes such devices as non-negotiable vouchers. At least one large
commercial blood bank operating in several states pays for a unit of blood with five dollar non-
negotiable vouchers. These are redeemable only at nearby liquor stores, some of which require a
purchase before they will cash the voucher. See Chicago Tribune, Sept. 14, 1971, at 1, col. 1;
Washington Evening Star, Nov. 17, 1971, § C, at I, col. 4.
Another way to narrow the gap between supply and demand for blood is to reduce the demand.
In addition to the utilization of surgical techniques that minimize the need for blood, this might
be done by reducing wastage, now estimated at 10 to 12 percent. Interview with Mr. Robert
Freeman, Director of Fiscal Operations, Red Cross Blood Program, Washington, DC., Oct. 1,
1971 [hereinafter cited as Freeman Interview]. The New York City wastage rate is reported to be
I I percent. N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1971, at 19, col. 4. See also Churg, Steinlauf, Brill, Gannon,
Ellis, Sobel & Weiss, Passaic Valley Blood Program, II TRANSFUSION 102 (197 1). Wastage occurs
when whole blood is not used within 21 days of collection. Such outdated blood is not entirely
useless. It can be broken down into its component parts that can be preserved and used separately.
Only the red cells must be discarded. See generally note 6, supra, at 2-9. Wastage may be reduced
by the freezing of blood but this is expensive and is now being done only for rare blood. Freeman
interview.
Some regard all but the purely altruistic donors as "paid." See Alsever, Hepatitis Following
Blood Transfusion: A Comparison of Paid and Replacement Blood Donors, 9 THE BULLETIN,
SOUT1i CENTRAL ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS 5 (July/Aug. 1969). But for health purposes it
is appropriate to classify altruistic, assurance donors and replacement donors as volunteers. Their
motivations may differ, but blood drawn from these donors is substantially less likely to transmit
hepatitis than that of those who receive cash when they "donate" their blood. See American
National Red Cross Organization and Administration, BPD (4.27) Oct. 1, 1970. Even with the
new test, some observers would rather take the untested blood voluntarily given by a friend or
relative, than tested blood from a commercial blood bank. For clinical studies comparing commer-
cial with volunteer blood, see note 5, supra.
There may be several explanations for this disparity. The most common is that commercial blood
banks in large urban centers are located in slums where they get blood from donors who are likely
to be in poor health and to live under substandard health conditions conducive to hepatitis. Some
have no fixed addresses and cannot be notified if their blood has been found to be dangerous.
Others may have an incentive to lie in order to earn the cash. Such hepatitis is also widespread
among those who use needles in conjunction with drugs, which, under current circumstances, makes
19721
Catholic University Law Review
How can two million more pints of safe blood be obtained each year? Two
extensive studies of non-paid donors were conducted in 1964. In one, 13,553
Red Cross donors answered questionnaires" Among the most significant re-
sults were that almost 80 percent of those responding were male and three of
every four were repeat donors. Sixty percent of the repeaters had previously
given between one and seven times; 30 percent had donated eight to 23 times.
Eighty percent stated that their most important reasons for giving blood were:
"A sense of duty;" "Right thing to do;" "Help a worthy cause;" "Save lives."
About ten percent emphasized the accumulation of assurance credits. These
results were echoed in a study of 5,600 donors in San Francisco. 0 In that
survey, over 80 percent had given before and more than half had previously
donated at least three times." These repeat-donor figures suggest that, with 100
donors from several segments of society suspect. See, e.g., Cohen & Dougherty, Transfusion
Hepatitis Arising from Addict Blood Donors, 203 J.A.M.A. 427 (1968); Dismukes, Karchmer,
Johnson & Dougherty, Viral Hepatitis Associated with Illicit Parenteral Use of Drugs, 206
J.A.M.A. 1048 (1968).
A related explanation for the disparity in risk asserts that hepatitis may be rampant among those
who have inadequate diets and sanitation, but adds that it may go undetected-either because when
incurred by children its symptoms are minimal, or because adequate medical care is usually
unavailable in these areas. Those contracting serum hepatitis remain carriers indefinitely, which
explains why many persons raised in marginal circumstances may be carriers as adults. Lederberg,
the Dilemnma of Tainted Blood, Washington Post, Aug. 1, 1971, § B, at 2, col. I.
The concern with paid donors may not extend to the entire class of persons who are paid. While
this may hold true for paid donors at urban commercial blood banks, Blood Services, Inc.,
operating primarily in the Southwestern and Midwestern States, relies heavily on paid donors and
contends that they are safer as a group than replacement donors. Korzekwa, Jordan & Alsever,
The Blood Donor: I. Who Are Our Blood Donors?, 240 AM. J. MED. Sc,. 36 (1960): Alsever, The
Blood Donor. II. Blood Donors Associated with Homologous Serum Hepatitis, 240 AM. J. MED.
Sci. 48 (1960). This view may be supported by a quotation from a husband and wife who are paid
donors; they responded as follows in an interview:
My wife and I come down here every nine weeks just like clockwork. We get a calendar
the first of each year and circle every ninth week. We get $10 apiece each time. That's
not bad, $20 each time . . . . You know, some people loek down on us paid donors,
but after all, they need our blood, and they're willin' to pay-so why should we give it
to 'em for nothin'? We're not like a lot of paid donors-you know, winos and addicts.
If you want to see some of them guys, go down to the commercial blood bank ...
S. Condie, The Social Psychology of Blood Donor Behavior 170-71 (1969) (unpublished thesis,
University of Pittsburgh).
9. THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS, SELECTED READINGS IN DONOR MOTIVATION AND
RECRUITMENT I (undated) [hereinafter cited as RED CRoss STUDY].
10. London & Hemphill, The Motivations of Blood Donors, 5 TRANSFUSION 559 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as London & Hemphill].
II. Half of the San Francisco donors personally knew someone who needed a transfusion. As
to their motivation, the women, the young, and the highly educated attributed their giving to
general humanitarian sentiments. Concern about possible future blood needs most strongly ap-
pealed to men and to those with low education and low income. One serious problem was revealed
in the San Francisco study: widespread misinformation concerning blood donation and blood
banking even among donors. London & Hemphill 563-65.
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million eligible donors in the country,12 the four million unpaid units each year
could well be donated by no more than two million persons. This might, in part,
reflect a reluctance to donate, but it also implies a large group from which new
donors might be sought.
Unfortunately, comparable information about non-donors is not available.
In the San Francisco study, it was found that non-donors felt stigmatized and
refused requests for interviews based on such a categorization.
13 The Red
Cross survey asked donors to give their explanation for the unwillingness of
others to donate. Fifty-seven percent said fear; 13 percent emphasized inconve-
nience; 12 percent said lack of understanding of the importance of giving; and
II percent cited indifference to the needs of others. When asked how to get
more donors, half stressed educating the public about the importance of giving,
while 15 percent stressed dispelling fear."
Apart from the occasional newspaper feature story about paid donors in
urban centers, 5 little information is available about paid donors. The San
Francisco study included some paid donors"6 who tended to be younger than
the volunteer group and more disproportionately male.
In a Pittsburgh study 7 respondent donors were classified as assurance, re-
placement, or paid. The paid donors were 90 percent male, and mostly young,
single, unemployed, 8 or if employed, working class. More than one-fourth had
family incomes of less than $4,000 per year.'" Surprisingly, the study also found
that nine percent of paid donors had incomes of more than $12,000 per year.
2"
12. Over half the population is within the eligible age category of 18 to 65, but allowance must
be made for those who may be physically unable to donate. BUR. OF CENSUS, UNITED STATES
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1970, at 10 (1970).
13. Id.
14. RED CROSS STUDY 4.
15. See, e.g., Chicago Tribune, Sept. 12, 1971, at 1, col. 1; Sept. 13, 1971, at I, col. 7; Sept.
14, 1971, at I, col. 2; Sept. 15, 1971, at 1, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1971, at I, col. 4; July 19,
1970, at I, col. 6; Washington Evening Star, Nov. 17, 1971, § C, at I, col. 4.
16. At the time of its 1964 study the Irwin Memorial Blood Bank was utilizing paid donors to
provide eight percent of its blood. London & Hemphill 560. Such donors now yield less than I
percent of Irwin's blood and are usually only those with rare blood types who may be called in
frequently and at inconvenient times. Interview with Mrs. Bernice Hemphill, Managing Director,
Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, San Francisco, Calif., June 3, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Hemphill
Interview].
17. Condie & Maxwell, Comparative Demographic Profiles: Voluntary and Paid Blood
Donors, 10 TRANSFUSION 84 (1970).
18. "Unemployed" was defined to include housewives and students. Id. at 85.
19. Id. Among replacement and assurance donors barely one-tenth were at that level. Perhaps
reflecting the employment situation and the income situation, the study found that while one-fourth
of the paid donors were "Afro-Americans," this group accounted for only 10 to 12.5 percent of
the replacement and assurance categories.
20. Id. 18 percent of the donors in the other groups had incomes exceeding $12,000 per year.
1972]
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Psychological experiments have been designed to learn what causes people
to engage in helpful behavior. Willingness to donate blood has been experimen-
tally used because it is one of the easiest pro-social acts to test. 21 Although most
of these experiments go only so far as a statement of willingness to donate
blood, the findings illustrate much about motivation toward this type of behav-
ior.
A 1969 study in Chicago2 was designed to compare the effectiveness of
several types of letters soliciting blood donors. All were identical except for the
second paragraph, which gave the rationale for donating. One version depicted
it as a social responsibility. A second highlighted the self-esteem involved. A
third underscored the shame of not giving. The fourth emphasized the financial
benefits that would accrue. Each version was sent to 324 persons who were
asked to return a stamped, self-addressed postcard if they were interested in
pursuing the question of blood donation. Of the more than 1,200 persons
addressed at random from the telephone book, a total of 15, barely two percent,
responded.2"
Undaunted, the same experimenter tried another technique.24 He asked do-
nors to suggest friends who had not previously given blood but who might be
persuaded to do so. The donor was asked whether he would allow his name to
be used in the solicitation. It was thought that both the role of the prior donor
as a model and the possible shame of letting this person down would spur
donations. Two hundred names were obtained and divided randomly into two
groups. Of the 100 solicited by personal reference, 13 were willing to give, as
were eight of the 100 prospects who received letters that did not use the prior
donor's name. The total response of ten percent suggests, at least, that the use
of prospects named by former donors is a much better route to new do-
nors-whether or not the former donor's name is used-than a random appeal
using the telephone directory.
Another study" tested the hypothesis that those who are self-satisfied are
more likely than others to engage in helpful behavior. Subjects were divided
equally into two groups, those told that they were taking a health test, and
those told that they were taking a test of creative ability. Within each group,
half were arbitrarily informed that they had done very well and the other half
were told that their performances were average. After the apparent end of the
21. But see B. LATANEI AND J. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER (1970).
22. J.H. Bryan, Assessment of Two Techniques of Blood Donor Solicitations, (1969) (unpub-
lished study).
23. Id. at 4.
24. Id. at 5-9.
25. Kazdin & Bryan, Competence and Volunteering, 7 J. EXPER. Soc. PSYCH. 87 (1971).
[Vol. 21:683
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experiment, each subject was invited to give blood. A person who had "done
well" on either test was far more likely to be willing to donate blood than the
others. Clearly, the individual's willingness to help others was increased by his
sense of self-assurance.
Another inquiry"6 explored guilt as a motivation for blood donations. Two
groups of subjects were assigned tasks that were, in fact, impossible. In one
group, the subjects were told that their failure to do the tasks would adversely
affect the grade given to a psychology graduate student. The other group was
told that their success or failure would not affect his grade. After all the efforts
had ended in failure and the experiment had apparently ended, each subject was
asked to donate blood at a nearby hospital. The first group was substantially
more likely to agree than were those who were not made to feel guilty-even
though they were not making amends toward the person hurt, but, rather,
helping an unidentified third party.
This discussion of donors and their motivation leads next to the question of
what can be done to alter the current situation and to the possible roles that
exist for government. First, we consider the existing blood banks. Although the
Red Cross has high visibility in the field of blood collection through some 60
rather autonomous local blood drawing centers, it draws only about half the
blood-three million units-used in the United States. About 20 percent is
collected by community blood banks serving one or more of the hospitals in a
particular area. The remaining share of the six million pints drawn annually
comes mainly from the commercial banks. 7
Patterns of collection vary so much even within a single geographical unit
that generalizations are of little value. In San Francisco, for example, the
supply is entirely volunteer, while just across the bay, in Berkeley and Oakland,
half the supply comes from paid donors. Nevertheless, when considering
changes that might be made by existing blood bank services, four models tend
to emerge. These follow current boundaries of geographical distribution, since
only the Red Cross has the potential to function on a nationwide basis and it
has shown little inclination to do so."2 While these models are not all mutually
26. Darlington & Macker, Displacement of Guilt-Produced Altruistic Behavior, 4 J. PERS. AND
Soc. Psyco. 442 (1966).
27. Supra note 6, at 21; American Red Cross News Service release of Mar. 2, 1971.
28. The Red Cross has developed no goals for expansion. Between 1949 and 1966 the Red
Cross established 56 regional blood centers. Since 1966 only three new centers have been added,
primarily because centers will be established only upon local request, regardless of the quality of
blood available in the area. The Red Cross does not compete with existing blood banks even if
they rely solely on paid blood: the choice is left to the community. Freeman Interview, supra note
8. But explicitly reacting to the introduction of legislation in Congress, the Red Cross has recently
announced its agreement with the concept of a "voluntary, nationwide, nonprofit blood service with
19721
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exclusive, they serve to clarify alternatives for reform.
1. The large volunteer group. This model requires the development of a
broadly-based volunteer effort in the communities served by a given bank,
stressing the social, moral, and psychological benefits of giving. While this
approach would avoid the hazards attributed to paid donors, the expense of
relying solely on this method could be substantial since many volunteers give
only once.29 Although the risk is less than that involved in using paid donors,3 0
it should be recognized that some incremental health risk is created by any
group of new donors, since even the best donor populations will have some
undetected hepatitis.
This approach would require an assessment of what kind of appeal could best
meet the community's needs. It might be necessary to decide whether to con-
centrate on population segments that have already provided most of the volun-
teers or on an under-represented group, such as young women. Housewives, for
example; could readily be reached through women's magazines and community
organizations such as the PTA. Perhaps emphasis on the changing social role
of women might prove effective. With sufficient publicity through newspapers
and broadcast media, blood banks might also stay open on occasional evenings
and weekends."
2. The assurance group. Through its emphasis on financial responsibility
uniform standards of operation" and several other features. The Red Cross announced that it was
prepared to "join with the government and with voluntary organizations to work for the future
attainment of these essential features." American National Red Cross, memorandum to Chapter
Chairmen from President Elsey and Chairman Harriman, Feb. 22, 1972.
Nor has the Red Cross made any systematic study of techniques for obtaining volunteer donors.
When campaigns conducted by local centers have been successful, the Red Cross has reported these
in a quarterly newsletter sent to directors of their centers. There has been no systematic psychologi-
cal testing either, although occasional publications of the Red Cross analyze this aspect informally.
The American Association of Blood Banks [AABB] is the only other blood banking group
organized on a nationwide basis. It is a voluntary organization providing various services to its
members. American Ass'n of Blood Banks, AABB Purposes and Programs (1969). Its principal
function is establishing minimum standards for its members and accrediting those who meet these
standards. Since accreditation is not a prerequisite for the operation of a blood bank, however,
the AABB cannot provide the base for centralized direction, control, and coordination of a national
blood banking program.
29. London & Hemphill 562. Women constitute a very large proportion of this donor
"dropout" population. Condie & Maxwell, Social Psychology of Blood Donors, 10 TRANSFUSION
79, 82 (1970).
30. See notes 5 & 8 supra.
31. Where local donating conditions justify the extra hours, Dr. Tibor Greenwalt, Medical
Director, Red Cross Blood Program, has urged his centers to remain open in the evenings and on
weekends [hereinafter all reference to Dr. Greenwalt is made to his capacity as Medical Director,
Red Cross Blood Program]. Letter from Frederic Laise, Vice President, American National Red
Cross, to Dr. Allen, July 14, 1971.
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and family health needs, this group plan readily attracts breadwinners and is
most effective through existing units based on employment and social relation-
ships. Perhaps the bank itself could offer to treat all its donors as members of
a plan 2 or simply ask a sampling of people in a community whether they
would like to join the program. A writing campaign here might be effective and
much cheaper than the impersonal mass media approach.
Since donors are, in a sense, under contract and must perform when called
upon or lose their benefits,3 donations can be judiciously spaced, enabling
control of the supply level. This leverage, however, creates a moral issue: in
effect, these donors are buying insurance with their blood. While this method
does not produce the health hazards of the donor who receives quick cash, it is
conducive to a certain degree of social stratification that may eliminate those
whose blood is collectively suspect. This relative selectivity is, in fact, one of
the potential attractions of membership.
34
3. The small volunteer cadre. If the broad voluntary approach is rejected,
one alternative might be to find a much smaller group who will donate upon
request. Given the current level of demand, not only would this approach be
adequate, but it would also avoid health risks and acquisition costs of relying
on a large and shifting group of first-time donors. At the extreme, if 1.25
million volunteer donors gave the maximum five times per year, national needs
would be met. Such a group would, presumably, be recruited by the usual
appeals to civic responsibility and humanitarian concerns as well as subtle
intimations of the virtues of membership in an "elite" group. Such an ap-
proach, however, would diminish the sense of community responsibility to
donate and might be resented precisely for its elitism.
4. The small paid cadre. So far the three models have excluded the paid
donor, as conventionally defined, but another approach could rely primarily,
if not exclusively, on paid donors. It might be possible to develop a roster of
32. Most blood assurance plans have individual as well as group coverage. Typical of these is
the American National Red Cross plan, which provides that any person donating one pint of blood
will receive a credit entitling the donor, spouse, minor children, parents, parents-in-law, grandpar-
ents, and grandparents-in-law to an unlimited amount of blood for one year. The Red Cross also
has a comparable group coverage plan that entitles all members and their families to unlimited
blood for one year if 20 percent of the group donates during the year. Interview with Dr. Donald
Avoy, Medical Director of American National Red Cross Four County Blood Bank, San Jose,
Cal., Apr. 4, 1971.
33. In most plans, however, a payment of up to $25 may be made in lieu of the annual donation.
34. It has also been argued that those who participate in blood assurance plans ought to be
guaranteed that the blood they receive in such a program will be similar low-risk quality. Allen,
Volumteer Blood for Everyone, 9 STAN. M.D. 2 (1970). This may be difficult to enforce if the
donor's need occurs when he is away from home and in an area in which such blood is in short
supply.
1972]
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regular donors whose health and living conditions would be stable and subject
to inspection.35 Based on a small group, this model is economical: acquisition
cost would be limied to the payment itself. Supply is easily regulated because
the donors are paid only if they come when scheduled.
This format is relied upon by Blood Services, Inc., which claims that its paid
donors as a group are safer than replacement donors." Although its fees to
donors are described as tokens of gratitude for their inconvenience and cooper-
ation, these payments are clearly integral to its effectiveness. Blood Services'
operations illustrate the problems of this model: questions of morality and
social responsibility are replaced by an exclusive marketplace focus, and, since
most states effectively exempt all blood banks and hospitals from the obligation
to pay for hepatitis37 there is little legal pressure for safe blood. This emphasis
may be justified when the health risks can be controlled, but less selective
competitive banks might emerge that would drive down both price and quality.
Blood Services has attempted to avoid this by concentrating on those areas
where it does not face competition for paid donors. Even without competition,
however, the fee might be an incentive to lie or an attraction to donors with
questionable health histories.
One way to offset these drawbacks, while encouraging regularity of giving,
might be to initially offer a minimal payment, gradually increasing for each of
the next five donations if they are without incident, and, finally, stabilizing it
at a high level. While this could raise the price of blood, the cost would, at least,
correlate with the safety and actual cost of the product. Due to the financial
incentives, the need for government licensing of blood banks, and perhaps of
donors, is much greater in this model than in any of the others.
Obviously the choice of model will define the kinds of donors sought and the
methods employed. Whatever the model, several other general steps to increase
the donor group are available to the private sector. One of these is the elimina-
tion of the disclaimer provision that donors must sign before they are permitted
to donate. The risk in giving blood is infinitesimal, but the presence of such a
statement might unnecessarily alarm the donor, even if the first donation is
painless and harmless. Lawyers have apparently recommended these provisions
as a possible legal aid to the blood banks.3" But their legal effectiveness is
35. See note 8 supra.
36. See Korzekwa & Alsever, supra note 8; Alsever, supra note 8.
37. At present some 40 states have statutes that seek to deny strict liability for transfusion-
associated hepatitis. Few negligence actions have been brought. See generally Franklin, supra note
I .
38. Interview with Dr. Edward Tuelher, Medical Director, and Mrs. Paul Henzlik, Director,
Peninsula Memorial Blood Bank, Burlingame, Cal., April 1, 1971.
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questionable, 9 and their use makes it necessary to find more donors, increas-
ing acquisition costs.
The role of health and medical insurance for blood transfusion presents a
more complicated situation. Most health and accident policies cover the expen-
ses of illness, including transfusion costs, within limits. Although money is not
an adequate substitute, this reimbursement removes the recipient's incentive to
replace blood with blood. It enables, however, the hospitals to buy more blood
and, at least in urban centers, may find its way to commercial, rather than
volunteer, banks. Some private insurers have begun to exclude transfusion
coverage, 0 and, if this becomes common practice, it should encourage partici-
pation in blood assurance plans as well as restore the pressure on non-assurance
patients to get more replacement donors. At present, however, there is little
likelihood that the exclusion will become widespread."
The use of cadaver blood might meet the needs of hospitals that run their
own blood banks. If blood is drawn within an hour after death, the average
adult body will yield ten units. Since it is essentially the presence of contamina-
tion that is crucial, this would reduce the risk of hepatitis in a multiple unit
transfusion to that of a single unit. It would similarly reduce the likelihood of
mismatching. The opposition to this on aesthetic grounds has been so substan-
tial that there has been little attention to the potential merits, but recent organ
transplants from cadavers might facilitate a change in social attitudes toward
this possible source of blood. Cadavers could, of course, best be utilized by
hospitals themselves, rather than by independent blood banks.
39. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON TRANSFUSION AND TRANSPLANTA-
TION, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF BLOOD TRANSFUSION 73 (2d ed. 1970).
40. Recognizing the problem of commercial blood, the Medical Policy Committee of Califor-
nia Blue Shield on August II, 1971, recommended "that as contracts are rewritten provision for
the payment of blood and/or blood by-products be deleted from basic and major medical con-
tracts." Letter from Dr. Ralph W. Schaffarzick, Chief Medical Advisor of California Blue Shield,
to Dr. Allen, Aug. 18, 1971.
Administrators at one bank said that they had a replacement rate of 86 percent in 1956. Then
insurers began to cover blood and the rate dropped to 70 percent. Then Medicare began covering
blood (see notes 84 and 85 infra) and replacement rate has dropped to 52 percent. Interview with
Dr. Edward Tuelher and Mrs. Paul Henzlik, supra note 38.
41. Recognition of the problems caused by insurance has not been universal. For example, a
letter of July 15, 1970 from Louis A. Orsini, Council Director of Health Insurance Association of
America, to Dr. Allen, denies that insurance coverage adversely affects the supply of volunteer
blood or that eliminating insurance will increase the number of voluntary donors. There is also
apparent consumer demand for this protection. Thus, the BSP Insurance Company provides
insurance coverage solely against blood charges. This suggests that the only way to end insurance
for blood costs may be legislation.
42. For use of cadavers in the U.S.S.R., see Kiel, Blood Substitutes in the Soviet Union, 9
TRANSFUSION 169 (1969). Should the United States try to utilize this source of blood, it could be
made possible through the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. See generally Burleson, The Uniform
A natomical Gift Act and Its Implications for Life and Health Insurance, 5 FORUM 171 (1969).
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Although the absence of a profit motive among volunteer banks may have
reduced incentives to improve quality and quantity of blood,43 if the current
nonchalance about the importance of obtaining safe donors continues, public
concern may force other methods to effect reform.
How can the law gain leverage in reducing the risk of hepatitis? The desira-
bility of judicial adoption of strict liability in cases brought by hepatitis vic-
tims-at least in the states that have not enacted legislation barring such a
result 44-has been discussed elsewhere. This article will discuss other types of
legislation, looking first at the relative merits of state and federal action. Blood
banks vary greatly throughout this country, and even in neighboring communi-
ties. Since health hazards differ greatly in large urban centers and in rural
states, flexibility at the state level might be desirable. Further, it might be
initially easier and more efficient for each state to regulate the health standards
of blood banking and to coordinate shipping of blood from one part of the state
to another."5 At present, blood banks fear that if they allow other banks to use
their surpluses, the next day they may find themselves in need. Not only does
this result in hoarding, it also allows up to a million pints of whole blood to
become outdated annually. 6
Federal action would have different advantages. The blood problem is a
national problem; no area is immune from hepatitis. Urban areas often overlap
state boundaries, and blood is now shipped in interstate commerce, even from
one region to another." This already involves some federal regulation,4" and
existing health agencies could easily be expanded to implement more extensive
controls and to coordinate usage more efficiently. Moreover, a national effort
would give blood donation greater publicity,49 and would create patriotic con-
43. Intensified efforts by the Red Cross and other non-profit groups would put commercial
banks out of business. Many commercial banks are owned by pharmaceutical manufacturers. The
Red Cross has taken pains to avoid criticizing the commercial banks. See the statement by Dr.
Tibor Greenwalt in note 85 infra.
44. Supra note 41.
45. Moreover, even if Congress might refuse to adopt general blood donor legislation, it might
well "consent" to interstate compacts among states having common blood problems. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10.
46. See TITMUss 55-59. The American Association of Blood Banks has tried to remedy this
through a system of clearinghouse credits that attempts to facilitate replacement donations and to
balance out oversupply and shortages among member banks. The procedure is explained in Hem-
phill, AABB National Clearinghouse Program, 98 MEDICAL TIMES 101 (Aug. 1970).
47. For concern about interstate shipment of blood, see Washington Evening Star, Nov. 17,
1971, § C, at I, col. 4.
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 262 (a) (1964); 42 C.F.R. §§ 73.3000-3524 (1971). Only 166 of the
7,000 blood banks in the country come under scope of these statutes. 117 CONG. REC. 11210 (daily
ed. Nov. 17, 1971) (remarks of Congressman Veysey).
49. The federal government has publicized the need for blood donation by such actions as the
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notations, reinforcing the other motivations. Further, federal action may be
the only way to challenge the powerful medical, hospital, and blood bank
lobby-an alliance that has obstructed the introduction of strict liability in this
area in a majority of states."0 Such an alliance is especially intimidating where,
as here, it is joined by the pharmaceutical houses-with no organized opposi-
tion. In sum, federal regulation by itself would likely have a more substantial
impact than state regulation alone. But it might be preferable to coordinate the
two, and we next consider some possibilities.
Whatever jurisdiction develops protective statutes, one of three kinds of
sanctions will likely be involved. First, selective incentives to influence the
behavior of various groups-blood banks, hospitals or prospective donors-are
available. Second, certain behavior could be prohibited. This could also be
combined with incentives to the same or other groups. Third, obligations-
such as requiring persons to present themselves a$ donors-could be created.
The proposals discussed below generally follow this sequence.
Major legislative steps toward blood transfusion safety have come only
within the last year. In 1971, the State of Washington enacted legislation
allowing victims of transfusion-associated hepatitis arising from "any transac-
tion in which the blood donor receives compensation" to use strict liability
theories." Such a provision increases the cost of commercial blood and subjects
hospitals buying such blood to strict liability.52
In the same year, the Texas legislature passed-but then rescinded-a bill
providing that "[n]o blood bank may pay cash for blood" except in the form
of checks mailed to the donor at least 15 days after donation. 5 Also, a strict
liability theory was made available to hepatitis victims.54 This was an effort to
annual proclamation of January as National Blood Donor Month, and the issuance of 130,000,000
postage stamps on Mar. 12, 1971 with the legend "Giving Blood Saves Lives." This was the first
such stamp and culminated a four-year campaign by the AABB. See, Note, 19 OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH NURSING 23 (May, 1971).
50. See note 86 infra.
51. WASH. LAWS ch. 56, § 1 (1971).
52. For this author's proposals, see Franklin, supra note 1.
53. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN., art. 4590-3, § 3(b) (Vernon Supp. 1972). After this provision
had been enacted, the legislature adopted House Concurrent Resolution 195 directing the enrolling
clerk to strike that portion of the bill. The clerk apparently failed to do this and the governor signed
the original version of the bill. The governor later signed the resolution with a message explaining
the situation. Letter from Professor Roy. M. Mersky, Director of Research, University of Texas
School of Law to author, Oct. 19, 1971. The president of Blood Services, Inc., which operates in
Texas, wrote to hospitals served by his blood banks in that state reassuring them that the provision
against direct cash payment was not legally applicable. Letter from W. Quinn Jordan to hospital
administrators, Sept. 7, 1971.
54. Although the prohibition sounds criminal, no criminal penalty is provided for violation.
Furthermore, the version as adopted was ambiguous as to whether a strict liability theory could
be invoked only by a patient harmed by blood obtained in violation of the statute, or whether this
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sub-classify paid donors, reflecting a legislative belief that hepatitis perils can-
not be blamed on all paid donors as such." Washington distinguished between
paid and unpaid donors; Texas distinguished those who are paid cash at once
and those who are sent checks later. Both agree on the need to discourage
irresponsible donors whose sole motivation is the "fast" money involved.56
Serious drafting problems are created because some classes of paid donors
are not dangerous. An immediate concern is whether the administrative cost
of making this distinction is commensurate with the benefits achieved. While
the media occasionally focus on the unhealthy skid row bum as the typical paid
donor, it is not known how many paid donors have useful blood, particularly
since this might well vary with the size of the community and the location and
tradition of its commercial banks. Nevertheless, we would properly be reluctant
to attempt to develop legal distinctions based upon subjective socio-economic
classifications. 7 Because it adopts an objective measure of payment practices
and can be policed fairly easily, the Texas distinction may be a viable solution.
Requiring a mailing address and a 15-day wait for compensation assumes that
donors who need quick cash or who have no fixed addresses are among the
worst risks. Although this is a partial and indirect approach to the problem, it
certainly would have been worth a try.
A variety of other approaches are available. The tax law could be employed
for incentive purposes-each "donation" of a unit of blood to an eligible organ-
ization could be taken as a $25 tax deduction to charity with an annual maxi-
rendered the offender strictly liable to all patients who suffered hepatitis from blood provided by
the offending bank. Note also that the Texas statute applies only to the blood bank itself, while
the Washington statute denied strict liability exemption to all involved in the proscribed transac-
tion. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4591-3, §§ 1-3 (Vernon Supp. 1972). WASH. LAWS ch. 56,
§ 1 (1971).
55. See, e.g., JENNINGS, AN INTRODUCTION TO BLOOD BANKING SYSTEMS, Technical Report
No. 27, Dec., 1967 (M.I.T. Operations Research Center), at 94-95, in which the author draws a
distinction between "mercenary donors" who receive benefits, perhaps even money, but who are
motivated primarily by a desire to help others. See also note 8 supra. See also Jennings, Not All
Paid Donors Pose Hepatitis Risks, 2 LAB. MEDICINE 8 (July 1971), in which the author notes that
"paid donors in certain categories are dangerous donors," but that this "finding has been utilized
by some individuals, including uninformed politicians, to create an indiscriminate condemnation
of the use of all paid donors." He argues that "the question is not whether the donor is paid or
not paid, but rather the socio-economic status of the donor." It is doubtful that the legal system
could effectively, or would want, to discriminate among donors according to socio-economic status.
56. Wisconsin has prohibited the operation of blood banks for commercial profit. Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 146.31(1) (Supp. 1971). This legislation was not motivated by concern for hepatitis-
infected blood, but was rather an attempt to prevent commercial blood banks from drawing blood
in Wisconsin and shipping it out of state, thereby reducing the supply of blood availabie in
Wisconsin. Letter from H. Rupert Theobald, Chief of Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau,
to author, Apr. 8, 1971. This statute does not prohibit payments for blood by non-profit banks.
57. Some would leave this to the judgment of the individual blood banks. See supra note 59;
Korzekwa & Alsever, supra note 8.
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mum of $125 per person.5" Although this proposal reflects the same hypothesis
as the Texas statute, the financial benefit here is more remote in form and in
time. Its probable appeal-mostly to middle-class and upper-class taxpay-
ers-is intended to induce persons to donate, without the health hazards gener-
ally associated with "paid" donors. At present, however, this plan is especially
limited in that more than half of all taxpayers do not itemize deductions and,
therefore, could not take advantage of this incentive .5 If the plan employed tax
credits, it would be available to all taxpayers, but might be less effective in
reducing the risk of hepatitis. Since it would involve the government in a
market approach to blood," this type of statute might be objectionable and,
perhaps, more humanistic approaches such as increased education and public
campaigns might be more appropriate before moving to tax incentives.61
Another possible approach is the reduction from 21 to 18 of the minimum
age at which blood may be given without parental consent, in keeping with
similar trends for voting and the assumption of other responsibilities. Signifi-
cantly, 18 year olds in some states are ineligible to give blood for compensa-
tion." However, this approach is less fruitful than it once was, since the hepati-
tis rate in this age group has increased due to the use of needles associated with
drugs." Indeed, campus blood drives might be a useful way of dramatizing
the impact of drugs, while increasing the volunteer blood supply. 4
58. H.R. 853, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971). The bill has been enthusiastically received in some
quarters. See editorial endorsement, On Stimulating the Gift of Blood, 173 SCIENCE 583 (1971).
The Internal Revenue Service has treated blood donations as non-deductible services, rather than
as the donation of property, which would have been deductible. Rev. Rul. 162, 1953-2 CUM. BULL.
127. The phrase "donation" in the bill is ambiguous, for if, as the sponsor claims, health is the
primary concern, then the bill should cover altruistic and assurance plan donors equally. Yet the
assurance donor is obtaining something else of material value in return for his donation, and does
not come within our conventional notion of one making a charitable gift.
59. In 1969 Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code to increase the standard deduction
from 10 to 15 percent, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 141(b) (Supp. 1971). Congress hopes to raise
the percentage of taxpayers using the standard deduction from 58 to over 70 percent. Report on
Tax Reform Act of 1969 to accompany H.R. 13270, S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 257
(1969).
60. It has been suggested that the tax deduction be accompanied by a similar tax treatment
for hepatitis carriers to induce them not to give blood. Supra note 12. This might be objectionable
as a bribe to deter criminal, or at least tortious, behavior.
61. These might include campaigns based on the medical advantages to the donor of giving
blood. Studies are now being conducted on the possibility that men who donate blood regularly
are less likely to suffer coronary attacks and strokes. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1972, at 31, col.
6.
62. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.21 (Supp. 1971); TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
4447j, § I (Vernon Supp. 1972). Presumably laws that lower the age of majority from 21 to 18
will enable 18 years olds to donate without parental consent or other restrictions. See, e.g., CAL.
LAWS ch. 1748 (1971).
63. See note 8 supra.
64. Unless a blood drive is keyed to a sharp increase in demand, it may produce more blood
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There is concern, among the more fully informed, about incentives aimed at
donors rather than banks. Even volunteer donors are not above lying to obtain
some accolade. 5 This concern should extend to governmental endeavor in this
area, such as a current bill pending before Congress, that would "develop a
national program to honor and recognize all voluntary donors."6
Voluntary or paid, paid now or later, the problems of line-drawing in the
area of incentives also arise in terms of any outright prohibition fortified by
criminal sanctions. The most obvious method would be a total ban on the
purchase of blood. This implies an acceptance of the correlation between bad
blood and paid blood and a reluctance, or inability, to make functional subdivi-
sions of paid donors. To fill the foreseeable gap, the remaining blood banks
could use, or combine, aspects of the three non-commercial models. It is not
clear, however, that a ban coupled with incentives would be adequate. Any
outright ban, then, should allow an adjustment period to permit blood banks,
hospitals and the public to conform.
Although prohibition avoids the problem of dividing lines, it may well be too
stringent. While the Red Cross does not pay for blood, other community banks
often make such payments-especially to induce donations of very rare blood. 7
One possible modification to absolute prohibition would be to forbid a blood
bank to pay for more than a specific percent of its blood supply. Further,
exemptions could be made available only for designated rare types and limited
classes of donors.
One prohibition might apply to blood drawn from the prison population.
Many states shorten prisoners' sentences in return for units of blood contrib-
uted."s It is claimed that blood drawn from the prison population is as likely
to carry hepatitis as is blood from the typical paid donor. Despite the counter-
argument that constant supervision for a lengthy period facilitates accurate
health records, some states, concerned about the risk, have repealed legislative
than can be used within the 2 1-day shelf-life. Another special problem of some blood drives is that
the implicit pressure might induce some to give who have reason to believe that they should not.
This might occur for example if fraternities were competing in a blood drive. See Glazer, Blood,
24 PUBLIC INTEREST 86, 93 (summer 1971). This wastage may be minimized by component therapy.
See note 8 supra.
65. Hemphill Interview, note 16 supra.
66. H.R. 11828, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(b)(3) (1971). See also, S. 2909, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971).
67. While persons with rare blood might be expected to be most concerned about creating an
adequate community supply, they seem as nonchalant about the problem as most people. See note
21 supra.
68. TITMUSS, supra note 3, at 67, 85-86. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 129A
(Supp. 1972); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7985(a) (Supp. 1971); S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-11.2 (Supp. 1971).
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inducements for prison donors." Even in those states, however, parole authori-
ties may well be expected to look favorably on donors. If the health risk is
demonstrable, the fact that prisoners are under constant supervision might be
used to impose an effective ban on their giving blood altogether. 0
A state legislature could also prohibit the liability disclaimers, discussed
earlier.71 Even if invalid, their possible adverse impact on potential donors
should be a matter of concern.
Legislative efforts might also be directed toward the role of private health
insurance, discussed earlier.72 The problems of trying to use money to replace
blood might alone justify the elimination of coverage for blood. Congress,
aware of these problems when enacting the Medicare program, denied coverage
for the first three units of any transfusion.73 That effort has not been success-
ful, but for reasons that may not apply to our situation.74
Another legislative alternative would be establishing a minimum price below
which blood could not be bought from donors. This would induce higher in-
come groups to become donors, substantially lowering the intrinsic health risk
and possibly allowing more rigorous screening of applicants' blood. The higher
payment per donor would be at least partially offset by a reduction in other
acquisition costs and liability for hepatitis. Since pricing cannot safely be left
to the operation of the existing market, the government must create its own
blood market. The market has not been functioning because the costs of hepati-
tis are only rarely brought into the price of blood by the legal system,75 because
general ignorance of the comparative risks has permitted utilization of paid
donors, and because banks using volunteer donors do not charge what their
69. California formerly reduced sentences of county jail inmates by five days for every pint of
blood they donated. Concern that this might induce misrepresentations as to hepatitis led to repeal
of the measure. CAL. LAWS ch. 657, § 1 (1968) repealing Cal. Penal Code § 4352. Letter from
Assemblyman Pete Wilson to author, June 18, 1971.
70. Slightly under five percent of our total blood supply comes from prison donors. TITMUSS
at 94.
71. See text at notes 42-44 supra.
72. See text at notes 40-41 supra.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(a)(2) (Supp. 1969).
74. During the first year after the statute's passage, of the 320,000 Medicare patients who
received whole blood, only about 120,000 satisfied the blood deductible through replacement. The
remaining 200,000 patients were charged for an average of two units each, totalling some $9.6
million. Letter from Alvin M. David, Ass't Commissioner for Program Evaluation and Planning,
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to Dr. Allen April 22, 1970. The obvious reason
for this low replacement rate in Medicare is that people over 65 cannot donate blood themselves,
and it is difficult for the elderly to find eligible donors unless they live near or with their children.
75. To the extent negligence can be shown, or where strict liability is permissible, such costs
will find their way back into the tort system. Otherwise they will appear among general costs of
disease and if covered at all by insurance, it will be through general medical insurance.
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product could bring on the open market.76 Since a private market solution is
unlikely to take hold, the minimum price approach may best combine the
market approach and a concern for safety. Some might object to the ineffi-
ciency of having the government set price levels.
One recent congressional proposal seeks to eliminate bad blood by classify-
ing banks." A federal administrator is directed to aid in developing an adequate
supply of voluntary blood as well as conducting evaluations of recruitment
techniques to obtain such donors. Banks would be classified as either A or B
depending upon the percentage of donors they pay: this percentage would have
to decline each year.78 Only Class A banks could maintain predeposit or assur-
ance programs and federal agencies could obtain blood only from Class A
banks.79 It should be noted that this scheme involves elements of prohibition
as well as incentives.
Finally, we turn to legislation that would involve aspects of compulsion. The
ultimate in compulsion would be simply to require two million citizens chosen
at random each year to donate one unit of blood. This would surely yield a
safer blood supply than the two million units now coming from paid donors,
but it presents a host of obvious philosophical, social, and administrative diffi-
culties. Government may perhaps inform citizens about social problems, or
even provide incentives, but compelling blood donations might well be viewed
as an infringement of the rights of the individual, not unlike attitudes toward
making any form of pro-social behavior obligatory, such as a general duty to
rescue.
8 0
We do, however, rationalize compulsory taxation and vaccination in terms
of the public good; compulsory blood donation, if that is the one way to
virtually eliminate hepatitis, might also be supported in that context. Even if
it were acceptable philosophically, however, such a venture would be an admin-
istrative nightmare. Perhaps it would be easiest to require persons to give blood
on their 18th, 19th and 20th birthdays. This would be a self-randomizing steady
supply that would introduce people to the habit of giving blood when young.
Even with this simple model though, major problems of collection and medical
or religious exemptions are present. These obstacles serve to reinforce the
76. For the comparative risk of commercial and volunteer blood, see note 5 supra. Presumably,
safer blood could command a higher price than commercial blood, yet it may be less costly to
obtain. The Red Cross supplies blood solely for processing costs, which vary regionally from $9.50
to 20 dollars, and is operating on a charitable basis regardless of how much the patient can afford
to pay.
77. H.R. 11828, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
78. H.R. 11828, 92d Cong., ist Sess., § 4(b)(6)-(7) (1971).
79. H.R. 11828, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., § 9-10 (1971).
80. See generally THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW (.1. Radcliffe ed. 1966).
[Vol. 21:683
Hepatitis
notion that such a plan should only be a last resort.
Another method of control might be to require banks to report to a central
registry all donors who have been linked with hepatitis incidents or test positive
in a screening test.8Y It would then be compulsory for banks to clear all new
donors. A rejected donor can now go to another bank and donate blood after
being implicated in a hepatitis episode. A national, or even state registry com-
puterized and keyed to fingerprints or other personal identification would do
much to diminish the risk of bad blood.
8 2
Conclusion
All these measures-incentives, prohibitions, and compulsions-have been dis-
cussed without addressing the broader question: should existing blood banks
be replaced by a national system organized and run by the federal government?
This is the practice in Great Britain and it has been acclaimed there as an ideal
system."s There are, of course, differences in political attitudes, geography,
size, demography, and medical practice between Britain and the United States;
and it should be remembered that no country starts from scratch in solving this
sort of problem.
An expansion of private institutions which already meet two-thirds of the
national blood needs appears preferable to creating a government system. s4 If
these institutions had worked together and confronted the commercial banks,
they might have met the hepatitis problem by educating the public about the
risks of using paid donors. But these groups continue to make statements that
reduce public pressure on commercial bank practices;" they continue to join
with the commercial banks in working for the passage of legislation limiting
81. For example, New York City has established a central registry for the medical history and
physical examination records of all blood donors in New York City. New York City, N.Y.,
Code § 567-70(a) (1970). See note 7 supra.
82. Paid donors are known to use fictitious names and to borrow or rent another person's social
security card in order to avoid identification. TITMUSS at 76. The costs of such a registry must, of
course, be considered.
83. See generally TITMUSS, but see M. COOPER & A. CULVER, THE PRICE OF BLOOD (1968).
84. The Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations has proposed that a -nationally controlled blood program be developed, through
the American Red Cross, if possible, which would insure adequate quantities of volunteer blood
through better means of recruitment and incentives." Statement of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. on Blood
Banks, Bal Harbour, Florida, Feb. 16, 1971.
85. See, e.g., statement by Dr. Greenwalt, in a recent television interview, as quoted by Con-
gressman Veysey of California:
You cannot blame the commercial blood banks for anything that has happened in this
country. They were needed to fill the gap. The gap that was not filled in a total program
by the Red Cross. [sic.]
117 CONG. REC. 11210 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1971).
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the legal remedies of patients who contract hepatitis;"8 and they continue to fail
to increase their facilities in the locations where reliance on paid donors has
been particularly hazardous." In the meantime, the problem of paid donors is
growing worse. 8 Now that most courts have been immobilized by statutory
controls, the only alternative is far-reaching legislative reform.
86. Both the Red Cross and the American Association of Blood Banks have supported such
statutes. Letter from Frederic Laise, Vice-President, American National Red Cross, to Dr. Allen,
June 4, 1971. American Association of Blood Banks, supra note 77, at 6. The Red Cross has taken
the position that strict liability would subject their organization "[t]o unconscionable claims which
would drastically affect the cost of blood. ... Letter from George M. Elsey, President of the
American National Red Cross to Dr. Allen, Apr. 6, 1971. However, the Red Cross is not trying
to avoid liability based on negligence. Letter from George M. Elsey, President of the American
National Red Cross to Dr. Allen, Mar. 18, 1971.
87. See note 28 supra.
88. The percentage of commercial blood in relation to the total appears to be increasing.
TITMUSS 96-98.
